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What’s happening to our universities? 
Ben R Martin 
Abstract 
In recent decades, many universities have been moving in the direction of a more hierarchical and 
centralised structure, with top-down planning and reduced local autonomy for departments. Yet the 
management literature over this period has stressed the numerous benefits of flatter organisational 
structures, decentralisation and local autonomy for sections or departments. What might explain this 
paradox? And why have academics remained strangely quiet about this, meekly accepting their fate? 
The paper critically examines the dangers of centralised top-down management, increasingly 
bureaucratic procedures, teaching to a prescribed formula, and research driven by assessment and 
performance targets, illustrating these with a number of specific examples. It discusses a number of 
possible driving forces of these worrying developments, and concludes by asking whether academics 
may be in danger of suffering the fate of the boiled frog. 
Keywords: universities; managerialism; bureaucracy; assessment; performance indicators; audit 
culture; boiled frog 
Introduction 
Amongst academics, one senses a growing dissatisfaction, disillusion or even despair with 
life in universities (e.g. Burrows, 2012; Gill, 2009; Ginsberg, 2011a; Haack, 2013). In 
discussions with colleagues from other institutions, virtually all speak of increasing 
frustration with their university, whether that university is in my own country (the UK), or 
elsewhere in Europe, or in North America or Australasia. (I am less familiar with the 
situation in Latin America, Africa and Asia.) All have tales of the latest management idiocy, 
of some new bureaucratic nonsense, of a patronising instruction as to how to teach, of the 
latest crude ‘performance target’ they must meet in their research.1 
It is puzzling what might be driving all this. Why, when the management literature of the last 
two decades has stressed the benefits of flatter organisational structures, of decentralisation 
and local initiative, of flexible and ‘lean’ systems and processes, have many universities been 
intent on moving in precisely the opposite direction of greater centralisation with a more 
                                                 
1  I do not attempt to deal here with another recent and worrying trend in academia, namely that concern with 
‘micro-aggression’ and ‘safe space’ has reached such a pitch in many universities that the principle of free 
speech is in danger of being considerably eroded. 
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hierarchical organisational structure, top-down management and decreased local autonomy 
for departments, and ever more cumbersome and intrusive procedures? Why, when 
academics are so quick to criticise other organisations for bureaucratic inefficiency, do we 
seem so keen on creating ever more exquisite forms of bureaucracy in our own institutions? 
Why, when the literature on pedagogy points to the dangers of intrusive micro-management, 
do we believe that teaching to some centrally designed template is the way forward? Why, 
when it is well known that the application of performance indicators encourages blatant 
game-playing to maximise one’s ‘score’ on the designated indicators and a neglect of other 
activities which, however worthy, are not captured by the chosen metrics, do we assume that 
this approach will result in ever more ‘excellent’ research with ever greater ‘impact’? And, 
perhaps most surprisingly, why when one could hardly imagine a more intelligent and 
articulate group, nor one better placed to make its views heard, have academics (with just a 
few exceptions2) remained so quiet and meekly acquiescent to their fate?3 
This article considers four main types of problems relating respectively to top-down 
university management, bureaucratic administrative procedures, teaching to a prescribed 
formula, and research driven by assessment and performance targets. The analysis draws 
upon a range of illustrative examples. It should be stressed that these are real examples based 
on extensive discussions with numerous academic colleagues from higher education 
institutions round the world. They should not necessarily be interpreted as a reflection of 
problems within my own organisation. The reader will doubtless recognise many of the 
problems as ones present in some form or another in their particular institution. 
In what follows, after a brief review of the literature and what it reveals about the relationship 
between organisational structure and the performance and effectiveness of organisations, we 
examine examples of the four types of problems. This is followed by an analysis of the 
possible causes or drivers of these growing problems, including the search for ever greater 
‘efficiency’, the rise of ‘the audit society’, the continuing development of ‘new public 
management’ (including its digital offshoot – see e.g. Dunleavy et al., 2005), the escalating 
international competition in which all universities are now drawn, the growth in the numbers 
of administrative staff, and a number of other factors such as the growing reliance on ‘head-
                                                 
2  Prominent exceptions include Diefenbach (e.g. 2005) and Ginsberg (2011a & b). 
3  “In some [universities], the faculty has already surrendered … This seemed to be the upshot of a conference 
on academic freedom and shared governance held in 2009 by the American Association of University 
Professors” (Ginsberg, 2011a, p.2). 
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hunters’ to help fill senior university positions. The article concludes by asking whether 
academics are in imminent danger of suffering the fate of ‘the boiled frog’. 
Centralised top-down management 
Twenty or thirty years ago4, many universities were relatively decentralised. University 
departments, schools, faculties, research centres and other units were granted considerable 
autonomy with regard to their teaching programmes, student recruitment, research projects 
and other activities. This is not to imply that such a structure was necessarily ‘better’, merely 
that it was different from that encountered today in most universities. The previous structure 
certainly had its problems, including the emergence of local fiefdoms, lack of consistency in 
the treatment of students, weak or incoherent research strategies, inordinate amounts of time 
spent on committees trying to coordinate efforts across departments, and so on. Faced with 
such problems, the solution seemed obvious to many Vice-Chancellors, Rectors and 
Presidents – more centralisation combined with stronger and more hierarchical top-down 
management and more formalised procedures (often involving ‘performance management’). 
Ironically, universities have been moving in this direction at precisely the same time as the 
management and organisational literature has been increasingly emphasising the benefits of 
flatter organisational structures, wider spans of control (in particular, taking advantage of the 
opportunities offered by IT), decentralisation and local autonomy for departments or sections. 
Over recent decades, there has been extensive research by management and organisational 
scholars on the relationship between organisational structure and performance. Much of this 
has focussed on centralisation, i.e. “the extent to which decision-making power is 
concentrated at the top levels of the organization” (Caruana et al., 1998, p. 18). As Zheng et 
al. (2010, p.765) recently concluded from an extensive review of the literature, “the majority 
of scholars have agreed that a decentralized organizational structure is conducive to 
organizational effectiveness”. Burns and Walker (1961) were among the first5 to point to the 
                                                 
4  In the case of UK universities, a key event was the Jarratt Report (1985), “which foisted on the sector the 
delusion that factory-floor ‘performance indicators’ are entirely suited to a higher-education setting, and 
which led to the abolition of academic tenure and the concomitant triumph of managerialism in the 
academy” (Alderman, 2009; see also Dearlove, 1997). In the US, a key date was 1996 and the publication of 
the Association of Governing Boards’ (AGB) report Renewing the Academic Presidency: Stronger 
Leadership for Tougher Times, which urged university presidents to “resist academia’s insatiable appetite 
for the kind of excessive consultation that can bring an institution to a standstill” (AGB, 1996, p.21). 
5  As discussed later, Woodward (1958) was another early pioneer, showing that, while mass production might 
benefit from greater centralisation, successful organisations based on batch and customised production 
generally had a flatter organisational structure with greater dispersion of control. 
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advantages of a decentralised ‘organic’ structure, stressing how this facilitated effective 
communication horizontally as well as vertically. Later researchers pointed to the benefits of 
decentralisation in terms of encouraging creativity (Khandwalla, (1977) and generating 
imaginative solutions to problems (Deal and Kennedy, 1982). Dewar and Werbel (1979) 
showed how a decentralised structure increased the level of motivation and satisfaction 
among staff, while Schminke et al. (2000), found that a decentralised structure resulted in 
increased responsiveness to changes in the external environment. 
Over the last 20-30 years of globalisation and growing competitive pressures, there has been 
increasing emphasis on the ability of organisations to generate and successfully implement 
innovations, both technological and organisational. Kimberly and Evanisko (1981) were 
among the first to demonstrate that the adoption of technological and organisational 
innovation is more prevalent in decentralised organisations. Later, in a very influential meta-
review of the determinants of organisational innovation, Damanpour (1991) confirmed the 
significant negative influence of centralisation and of formalisation on organisational 
innovation. (Formalisation can be defined as “the degree to which decisions and working 
relationships are governed by formal rules, standard policies, and procedures” – see Lee and 
Choi, 2003, p.192; it is discussed further in the next section.) 
Later work has shown, firstly, that the importance of decentralisation is even greater for 
organisations operating in uncertain environments (e.g. Baum et al., 2003; Nahm et al., 
2003). Secondly, as we move towards a more knowledge-intensive economy and society, the 
importance of knowledge management has become all the greater. Various studies have 
demonstrated that a decentralised organisational structure is more conducive to effective 
knowledge management. For instance, Nahm et al. (2003) showed that the benefits of 
decentralisation are all the greater in organisations where there is more learning, more 
knowledge based work and more knowledge-sharing. Likewise, Pertusa-Ortega et al. (2010) 
revealed how decentralisation fosters knowledge creation because more individuals become 
involved in decision-making, generating a greater number and variety of ideas (which may 
result in the creative integration of divergent perspectives) and helping to ensure the 
successful implementation of the chosen ideas. 
While there are many studies of the relationship between organisational structure and 
performance in the private sector, there are far fewer on public organisations, and very few 
indeed focussing on universities. One exception is the study by Cameron and Tschirhart 
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(1992), who concluded that “Participative decision processes are more effective than 
autocratic or centralized decision processes primarily because in a post-industrial 
environment the need for multiple sources of information and multiple perspectives is 
escalated” (p.102). More recent studies have been more critical. Diefenbach (2005), in a case 
study of the effects of implementation of ‘new public management’ on a major university, 
revealed fundamental internal contradictions in the approach and noted the “cynical use of 
latest management techniques by senior managers in order to gain more power and control 
internally” (ibid., p.126). Nedeva and Boden (2006) analysed the impact of neo-liberalism on 
universities, identifying the dangers this brings in terms of a loss of capacity to generate 
‘understanding’ type knowledge. More recently, By et al. (2008) have argued that 
“the audit culture and managerialism have created an environment that 
encourages opportunistic behaviour such as cronyism, rent-seeking and the rise 
of organizational psychopaths6. This development will arguably not only lead 
to a waste of resources, change for the sake of change, further centralization, 
formalization and bureaucratization but, also, to a disheartened and exploited 
workforce, and political and short-term decision-making.” (ibid., p.21). 
Given that universities operate in uncertain environments and are centrally involved in the 
generation, diffusion and application of knowledge, not to mention in nurturing creativity, 
innovation and problem-solving abilities, there is all the more reason to expect the trend in 
universities over the last 20 years would have been towards a more decentralised structure. 
However, the reverse appears to have been mostly the case. Why might this be? 
A new Vice-Chancellor, Rector or President (henceforth the term ‘Vice-Chancellor’ is used 
to cover all these titles for a university head) has generally been appointed to address specific 
problems and to improve the university’s performance in certain respects (often financial and 
in terms of its position in various ‘league tables’). Almost without exception, they assume 
that the ‘solution’ to these problems and challenges involves a more centralised approach to 
decision-making and running the university. Invariably their plans will include ‘growth’ (they 
feel it is essential to demonstrate to those who appointed them that numbers have gone up 
during their period in office, not least to justify the sizeable salary increases they have come 
to expect as a right), and they may well assume that they have no option but to centralise 
decision-making in order to maintain ‘control’ as their university increases in size. Moreover, 
                                                 
6  Organisational psychopaths are defined as individuals “with no conscience … who are willing to lie and are 
able to present an extrovert … charming façade in order to gain managerial promotion via a ruthlessly 
opportunistic and manipulative approach to career advancement” (Boddy, 2006, p.1462). A case-study of an 
organisational psychopath in academia can be found in Diefenbach (2013, pp.152-55). 
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faced with escalating competition (whether for students, income or league-table positions), 
they again automatically tend to assume the solution is greater centralisation of decision-
making, or perhaps they just lack the self-confidence that a decentralised but well motivated 
institution can survive in an era of intense competition. Yes, there may well be issues with 
lower-performing departments that need to be addressed, but surely that does not mean one 
has to impose a ‘lowest common denominator’ approach across all departments. Different 
faculties or departments operate in different environments or ‘market niches’, and they may 
therefore benefit more from the local autonomy to experiment, adapt and evolve, as opposed 
to having a standard centralised approach imposed from above. 
In addition, many new Vice-Chancellors, particularly those appointed from outside that 
university, reach instinctively for the ‘lever’ of restructuring – merging departments and other 
units into larger agglomerations of schools or faculties. This has the benefit of resulting in a 
cleaner, simpler organisational chart, and of fewer individuals reporting to the Vice-
Chancellor. Yet there is no rigorous evidence that bigger operating units in higher education 
institutions are more efficient, a belief with overtones strangely reminiscent of Soviet 
ideology that scale is the solution. It has often resulted in more layers of hierarchy (deans of 
faculties, heads of schools, departmental heads, and so on). Over time, there has been a 
concomitant withering away of consultation. Changes instead tend to be imposed by fiat, 
often introduced by documents or emails that begin with that ominous Orwellian phrase “The 
University has decided …” Such structural changes frequently seem to defy logic. Those 
upon whom the change is being inflicted are left wondering, “If this is the solution, what is 
the problem that is supposedly being solved?” There is no apparent awareness within senior 
management of the potential disadvantages of the new structure, let alone of any balance 
sheet of the respective pros and cons of the old versus the new structure. All of which has 
resulted in deteriorating morale and a growing sense of disaffection and even alienation 
among staff (e.g. Burrows, 2012; By et al., 2008; Gill, 2009). 
In the past, prior to a proposed restructuring or any other major management change, there 
was normally an extensive process of consultation with faculty, for example, with senior 
university officials attending departmental meetings to explain the problem and the proposed 
solution, to address any queries and indeed to listen to any alternative solutions. This would 
then be followed by intensive debate on the university ‘senate’ (or whatever body was 
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concerned with academic governance). Most of this has long since gone7, replaced by email 
directives and summons to attend termly meetings with the Vice-Chancellor and the senior 
management team, meetings that essentially take the form of a presentation by the senior 
managers followed by a couple of desultory questions from the audience on some relatively 
trivial matter (e.g. car-parking arrangements). 
The drift towards centralisation takes other forms. For instance, in the past, departments and 
other operating units would contain quite a few support staff in the form of secretaries, 
technicians, librarians, financial administrators and so on. However, for reasons that defy 
logic (or that at least have not been explained to university faculty8), these have often been 
removed from departments to be installed in central offices. To take one example, in the past 
most IT staff were ‘on the ground’. Since the majority of IT problems turn out to be relatively 
simple for an expert to resolve, it would previously take them just a few minutes to sort out 
most such matters. However, once these staff have been centralised, the academic facing an 
IT problem now needs to go online and submit a request for help (difficult to do if your 
computer has just crashed!) in order to receive a booking number. If lucky, an IT person may 
schedule a visit two or three days later, by which time one may have missed a crucial 
deadline for submitting a research proposal or some other important event. 
Similarly, the removal of financial administrators from departments to central offices can 
increase the delay in submitting research applications (often against tight deadlines), while 
the centralisation of other administrative staff means that academics inevitably end up doing 
more things themselves – e.g. photocopying, making travel arrangements – thus lowering 
their productivity with respect to their core jobs. Moreover, the centralisation of support staff 
charged with student support can have a negative impact on student satisfaction as central 
administrators lack the ‘local’ knowledge required to address many of the needs of students. 
In summary, despite the wealth of management literature on the benefits of a decentralised 
structure, particularly for organisations where knowledge, creativity and innovation are 
central and for organisations operating in uncertain environments, Vice-Chancellors and their 
                                                 
7  In many universities, there has been a process of ‘emasculation’ of university senates or congregations, 
which have lost authority relative to university councils or boards (Ginsberg, 2011a, p.15). Ginsberg cites 
many specific examples of this process. 
8  Such initiatives may reflect university management’s relentless search for ever greater ‘efficiency’. Yet what 
looks like greater efficiency to central management almost invariably means more effort for staff lower 
down the organisation. 
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equivalents have, over the last 15-20 years, increasingly assumed that further centralisation is 
the answer to their particular problems. At the same time, they have mostly failed to explain 
to their staff what specifically are the goals of that centralisation, why centralisation offers 
the best means of achieving those goals, and what are the success criteria against which such 
changes should be judged. In any other organisation, academics would be among the first to 
ruthlessly expose such failings.  
Bureaucracy 
Universities today operate in a demanding and fast-moving environment, subject to a plethora 
of pressures, expectations, regulations and laws (Bozeman, 2015).9 Yet in responding to 
these, the tendency among many universities (and perhaps this is more pronounced in the UK 
than elsewhere – see Hoggett, 1996) is to interpret all these over-literally, and to devise some 
‘gold-plated’ solution to even a relatively minor problem, so that they can then triumphantly 
claim to have adopted ‘best practice’. The result is all too often a disproportionate response in 
terms of greater formalisation and more burdensome bureaucracy (i.e. ‘red tape’ – see 
Bozeman, 201510), with no consideration of the load (particularly the cost in terms of 
additional time) being imposed on those lower down the organisation expected to comply. 
For example, in the case of the UK, and perhaps in other countries as well, government 
concern with illegal immigrants has sometimes focused on the problem of certain students 
registering at colleges in order to obtain an entry visa, and then not turning up at that college, 
but instead disappearing into the general population. This may well be a problem at language 
schools, lower-level business or administrative colleges and the like. But there is little 
evidence that it is a significant problem at universities. Nevertheless, many UK universities 
have responded with gusto. In one case, lecturers suddenly received an email instruction (all 
too many initiatives these days, especially those of a more difficult or controversial nature, 
are launched by email – ‘management by email’ seems sadly to have become the norm11) to 
complete an attendance register in each and every lecture. This ignored the fact that for some 
                                                 
9  A survey of 13,000 principal investigators of federally funded research projects in the US found that “42% 
of their research time associated with federally-funded projects was spent on meeting requirements rather 
than conducting active research”, leaving just 58% for “active research” (Schneider et al., 2014, p,6). And 
with regard to teaching, figures quoted in Bozeman (2015, p.11) suggest that a quarter of the tuition fee 
income for students at US universities may go on “regulatory compliance” (see also Ginsberg, 2011b). 
10  Bozeman (2015) also includes definitions of, and useful distinctions between, the related concepts of 
bureaucratisation, formalisation and red tape. 
11  ‘Management by email’ does not yet seem to have been much studied in the management literature; there is 
certainly no evidence to suggest that it might be effective – rather the reverse (see e.g. Thomas, 2012). 
What’s Happening to Our Universities? 
 
 9 
courses there may be several hundred students in the lecture hall, so it would take far too long 
to read out a roll-call. It ignored the fact that such a procedure would be seen as demeaning 
by students, harbouring resentment among them. The only alternative was to circulate an 
attendance list for students to tick their names, but it is well known from past experience that 
lazy students who cannot be bothered to turn up for lectures simply ask a friend to ‘sign’ in 
their place. Moreover, when faculty members got hold of the relevant report from the 
immigration body which, according to the university, was the source of this new requirement, 
there was indeed mention of roll-calls, but only for schools and colleges. Universities were 
not expected or required to adopt such measures, but merely to report whether, on the basis of 
existing mechanisms, they were aware of any student who had failed to show up.12 Most 
academics probably ignored this instruction. Although other emails followed, instructing in 
ever more strident terms that the procedure be followed, they eventually stopped, leaving a 
legacy of resentment and a hardening of the division between ‘them’ and ‘us’. 
A year or so later, concern had evidently spread to the monitoring of PhD students at UK 
universities. It was never clear whether this was also due to a worry that some might not be 
bona fide students (even more unlikely at PhD level), or whether it was instead a concern that 
PhD supervisions resulted in little or no written record and hence were potentially vulnerable 
to an official complaint or legal challenge from a disaffected student as to whether the 
doctoral training provided was adequate. Whatever the cause (and the fact it was never 
explained is symptomatic of the wider problems examined here), various universities decided 
to introduce a procedure to provide an official record that PhD supervisions had taken place. 
One university came up with a bizarre solution. Again launched by a collective email, 
supervisors were instructed prior to each supervision to book a room on the university 
computerised room-booking service. This was somewhat ironic as a year earlier, in a move 
towards centralisation, the power to book a room had been taken away from academics (who 
presumably could no longer be trusted to do this responsibly) and instead concentrated in the 
hands of a few dedicated administrators. The consequence of this was that few academics 
now knew how to use the computerised room-booking service. However, the university had 
                                                 
12  According to the UK Border Agency (2009, p.21), “a Sponsor must report if a student misses 10 expected 
contacts. For students in schools, Further Education (FE) and English Language Colleges this will normally 
be where the student has missed two weeks of a course without an appropriate explanation. In the Higher 
Education (HE) sector, where daily registers are not kept we will accept this reporting where the student has 
missed 10 expected interactions (e.g. Tutorials, submission of coursework etc).” In other words, universities 
are not expected to put in place a new system for monitoring attendance at each and every lecture, but merely 
to report if existing procedures indicate a repeated failure e.g. to submit coursework or attend tutorials. 
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thought of this too, and offered the opportunity for all supervisors to attend a training session 
on how to use this system. No coherent justification was given for this bureaucratically 
baroque procedure for recording PhD supervisions. There was no recognition that some 
supervisions are not ‘booked’ in advance – they just happen when a doctoral student knocks 
on one’s door to ask for advice, or when the supervisor and student bump into each other over 
coffee. Another fundamental flaw was that the room-booking service could only be used to 
book designated teaching or committee rooms; many other rooms were not part of the 
system, so supervisions conducted outside of this – for instance, in the coffee area or over 
lunch in the cafeteria – were all presumably ‘unsupervisions’ in Orwell’s terminology. 
Research ethics is another area where there has often been a process of bureaucratic overkill. 
For certain specific types of research, it is perfectly right and proper that the principal 
investigator should go through an ethical review procedure – for example, research involving 
medical patients or animals, or studies involving vulnerable individuals such as children or 
illegal immigrants. However, outside these specific areas, for 90 or 95% of research projects 
there are no significant ethical issues that need to be externally reviewed. (There are, after all, 
already well-established conventions from professional bodies to guide researchers in dealing 
with such matters as data confidentiality and anonymity of interviewees.) In response to 
pressures primarily from medical research funding agencies, many universities have 
developed a thorough but also extremely complicated ethical review procedure, which they 
have then proceeded to apply indiscriminately to all research projects. For instance, any 
project involving interviews is often seen as requiring ethical review, regardless of the fact 
that most do not involve ‘vulnerable individuals’ but employees of some organisation who 
are being interviewed by virtue of their position or professional expertise. Those responsible 
for enforcing such an all-embracing ethical review procedure are apparently unable to 
conceive of a distinction between ‘vulnerable individuals’ and other interviewees, and hence 
to come up with a much simpler solution for the latter. Instead, a typical university solution 
involves completing a multi-page form requiring inordinate amounts of redundant 
information. To oversee the ethical review process, a large central committee of senior 
university staff and external members must be set up, along with numerous departmental sub-
committees to review the hundreds of cases caught up in this new procedure. Indeed, it may 
be applied not just to all the new research projects of academic faculty, but also to PhD 
projects, MSc dissertation projects and even undergraduate dissertation projects. With regard 
to the last of these, in the past some undergraduates might have carried out a few interviews, 
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for instance, of other students or local businessmen, as part of their dissertation. Now, 
because any project involving interviews is required to go through the complex and time-
consuming ethical review procedure, many may be disinclined to pursue this approach. 
Likewise, social work students may no longer be encouraged to do field work despite the 
nature of their future professional responsibilities involving individuals rather different from 
those described in previous literature. 
In short, this is an all-too-typical example of a response to a ‘problem’ that is totally 
disproportionate to the nature and extent of that problem. The result is a substantial addition to 
the workload of all those involved, in particular of busy academics who, on the one hand, are 
being exhorted by senior university management to be more entrepreneurial in bringing in 
new research funds, and, on the other, are finding themselves beset with ever more 
bureaucratic hurdles to negotiate. Moreover, in this case as in others, it is by no means clear 
that such a cumbersome ethical review procedure will actually result in greater attention being 
paid by academics to ethical issues. Instead, it may encourage a tendency to fill in the forms 
and then to assume that the problem has ‘gone away’ and is now someone else’s 
responsibility. In the past, where the occasional ethical issue did arise in a research project, it 
was normally picked up by the academic involved, who would discuss it with senior 
colleagues, put in place sensible measures for dealing with it, and then feel some sense of 
‘ownership’ in terms of responsibility for ensuring that no ethical problem did in fact ensue. 
The new approach, by contrast, is more likely to generate a sense of ‘infantilisation’ among 
academics subject to such disproportionate bureaucratic procedures. Issues to do with ethics 
and integrity and certainly are certainly of vital importance, but surely a better approach is one 
that focuses on training students and early-career faculty to be sensitive in dealing with ethical 
issues rather than an over-determined approach that tends to exclude ethical judgement. 
While the root cause of much of the creeping bureaucracy may be attributed to external 
requirements, some of it is self-imposed. For example, in days gone by, many decisions with 
regard to administrative matters relating to teaching could be taken by the individual course 
convenor or programme director in consultation with the relevant faculty involved. On one 
occasion, following a switch to require that all courses had to be assessed and not just those 
later in the programme, a query emerged as to what procedure should be adopted for a 
student who had just failed the assessment for a particular course in the first term. The 
director of the teaching programme duly consulted with the other faculty involved, who all 
agreed the student should retake the assessment by a certain date. However, when the 
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programme director reported to the university that this was the plan, he was informed that 
such a matter could not be decided in this way. Instead, a formal meeting of the teaching 
committee must be convened, attended by a quorum of faculty and with the appropriate 
administrative staff present to take minutes. On turning up for the meeting, for which this was 
the sole item on the agenda, the faculty were surprised to find not one but five university 
administrative staff in the room. And instead of the meeting taking a few minutes, as they had 
envisaged it would, it went on for an hour as the various administrative staff thought of more 
and more procedural matters that supposedly needed to be addressed. Finally, towards the 
end, the programme director asked if the same procedure which had just been laboriously 
agreed over the course of the previous hour could be applied if other students were to fail a 
course the following term. He was informed that this was not permissible, and that instead the 
teaching committee would have to be reconvened to consider the same matter all over again. 
The reader can doubtless come up with a plethora of other examples where academic 
activities have, in recent decades, become ever more formalised, complicated, bureaucratic 
and time-consuming.13 Indeed, it is rather difficult to think of a single area of university 
activity that has become less bureaucratic over time. 
Teaching 
In the past, it was certainly the case that some lecturers were poor. They were not formally 
trained to teach, and they received little or no structured feedback. Improvements were 
undoubtedly needed. Yet as with other improvements in universities, often the tendency is to 
take things too far. The assumption is that if something is good (e.g. training courses), then 
‘more is better’. However, as with most things, diminishing returns quickly set it, while the 
costs of yet further ‘improvements’ rise, not least the burden in terms of time absorbed. 
Another ‘cost’ takes the form of increased irritation among university faculty that they are 
being treated like infants rather than professionals, for example, with regard to patronising 
instructions over how to use Powerpoint in their lectures. Many meekly go along with the 
required instructions (for example, that each lecture must begin by outlining the ‘learning 
outcomes’), resulting in a form of ‘teaching by template’. However, whether the end result is 
better quality teaching must be open to considerable doubt. 
                                                 
13  In some cases, it is academics themselves who are responsible, for example with demands for more 
transparency or accountability from senior university management resulting in more formal procedures. 
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Those lecturers preparing new courses are likely to encounter particular problems as they 
wrestle with complex instructions about ‘modularisation’ and ‘credits’. For example, courses 
or modules can only be a certain ‘size’ in terms of the number of credits. Those deemed to be 
too big or too small are forced to become ‘the right size’ in terms of credits. There may well 
be some justification for this but, if so, it is known only to central university administrators. 
Such a change has, like others, often been introduced by fiat, with no prior consultation and 
no coherent rationale. The result, again, is resentment, cynicism and sullen acquiescence. 
In previous years, similar experiences were encountered with ‘semesterisation’, an ugly 
neologism typical of the managerialist terminology invoked for changes that lack a credible 
rationale. In many countries, the academic year has traditionally been divided into three 
terms, each of 10-12 weeks, although some US universities have long operated on the basis 
of two ‘semesters’. At a certain point, many UK universities decided to move to a system of 
two four-month semesters. (The fact that a ‘semester’ is, by definition a six-month period 
seems to have been overlooked.) This was claimed to be ‘better’, even though the first 
semester has to be interrupted by Christmas and New Year holidays, and the second by Easter 
holidays. Again, there may well have been some explanation for such a change that was 
known only senior university officials, but the rest of academic faculty were left struggling to 
think what could be the ‘problem’ to which two semesters (each fragmented into parts by 
immovable public holidays) was the ‘solution’. 
In order to improve the quality of teaching, a process of student feedback has been in 
operation for several decades. In this, forms are completed by students at the end of each 
course, and the results passed back to the lecturers involved. In addition, student 
representatives or departmental teaching committees might pursue the more important issues 
raised. In recent years, however, various ‘new and improved’ procedures have been 
introduced, not least because of the rapid increase in student fees and students hence feeling 
that they are ‘customers’ and that ‘the customer is king’. In the case of UK universities, there 
was felt to be a need for a national feedback system. In 2005, the National Student Survey 
was introduced.14 As with any new assessment procedure, this quickly affected the behaviour 
                                                 
14  Prior to that, there had been a Teaching Quality Assessment process to evaluate the teaching of departments 
in UK universities on the basis of set criteria. However, this proved incredibly burdensome, with many 
person-months of effort being devoted to producing a roomful of written documentation designed more to 
impress the visiting assessment team than to actually enhance the quality of the teaching delivered. That 
assessment scheme was eventually abolished. However, in 2015 the UK Government announced their 
intention to set up a Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF). Although well intentioned, this will doubtless 
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of the system it was monitoring, not always in quite the way intended. Individual universities 
realised that they needed to ensure a high response rate (a low response rate was self-
evidently ‘a bad thing’) as well as a high proportion of positive responses. As the time 
approaches when the Survey is to be completed, a sequence of increasingly panicky 
instructions are sent to lecturers by email (as usual), asking them to do all they can to 
encourage as many students as possible to complete the form (e.g. by setting aside time in 
lectures so that they can make sure the students do as they are told, or by offering students 
some ‘incentive’ to complete the survey). Lecturers are also expected by university 
administrators to explain to students that too many negative responses will result in the 
university looking bad, hence devaluing the standing of their eventual degree in the eyes of 
employers, while a very positive response, in contrast, will obviously enhance their 
employment prospects. As a result, it is not clear what significance, if any, can be attached to 
the results of such a survey.15 Does a positive evaluation mean that the quality of teaching in 
a university is high or merely that this particular university has pursued a more aggressive 
strategy in how it has ‘encouraged’ its students to provide positive feedback? There must also 
be concerns about what this particular aspect of ‘education’ does for the sense of morality 
engendered in students coerced or nudged into playing the game. 
Likewise, it is not clear what significance can now be attributed to the proportion of ‘first 
class’ or ‘upper second class’ degrees that each university awards. In the past, this was used 
as an indicator of the quality of graduates and the education provided by universities. 
However, just as the use of exam passes as an indicator of school performance in the UK has 
resulted in barely credible year-on-year ‘improvements’, so this university performance 
indicator has inevitably been the victim of ‘grade inflation’, with success rates rising year 
after year (Johnes, 2004, p.472). 
In short, a succession of doubtless well intentioned exercises to enhance the quality of 
university teaching have consumed growing amounts of effort and time, stimulated various 
forms of game-playing (some involving questionable ethics), and encouraged ‘teaching to a 
template’ while having little or no benefit in terms of quality of teaching offered to students. 
                                                                                                                                                        
consume vast amounts of bureaucratic effort and encourage new and elaborate forms of game-playing 
(particularly if the results are used to set the level of fees that individual institutions can charge) but with 
relatively little benefit to the actual quality of teaching (see the discussion of the Research Excellence 
Framework in the following section). 
15  For a critical assessment of student evaluation schemes, see Stark and Freishtat (2014). 




As with teaching, it is undoubtedly true that there were problems in the past with university 
research – for example, research findings that were never published, the lack of a clear, 
coherent research strategy whether at the level of the department or the university as a whole, 
even some faculty choosing to do no research and instead concentrating on teaching and a 
measure of ‘scholarship’ to ensure their teaching was high quality and up to date. Beginning 
with the UK, many countries have now introduced various forms of research assessment to 
address such issues. In the UK, the first Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) was conducted 
in 1986 and since then a further six have been carried out. In the first two or three of these, 
significant progress was undoubtedly made in tackling the problems identified above. After 
that, however, diminishing returns began to set in, the ‘easy’ gains having already been made 
(Geuna and Martin, 2003). At the same time, for each successive RAE, the costs continued to 
rise inexorably as universities put more and more effort into preparing their RAE submissions 
in order to do better than their ‘competitors’ – a classic example of the ‘Red Queen’ effect 
(Van Valen, 1973). In each university, a senior officer (or an entire team) would be 
designated to oversee the university’s preparations. And in each department or ‘unit of 
assessment’, one or more senior faculty would be delegated with the task of working with 
faculty over the years before the RAE submission date to ensure that they each had four good 
publications ready in time. If the costs of all the time spent on these preparations is added to 
the direct costs of operating 60 or so panels to assess all the RAE submissions, then the total 
cost of the 2001 RAE was estimated to be of the order of £100 million (Sastry and 
Bekhradnia, 2006, p 5). This is a rather expensive solution to the question of how to 
distribute research funds to 100 or so UK universities. (Other government departments would 
be rightly ridiculed if they spent a similar sum on a resource allocation decision of this size.) 
However, a greater concern is with the longer-term effects on research and on the behaviour 
of university faculty. First of all, the RAE has over time tilted the balance from teaching to 
research because improved performance in the latter brings financial rewards but not for the 
former (although that may change if the proposed Teaching Excellence Framework is 
introduced in UK universities). In addition, promotion decisions are more likely to be swayed 
by RAE performance than teaching ability, sending a strong signal to faculty that this is 
where they should concentrate their efforts. Secondly, given that the RAE has been structured 
around traditional disciplines, and given that those departments that have been rated most 
highly by the discipline-based panels are those perceived to have contributed most to the 
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disciplinary mainstream, the RAE and its successor, the Research Excellence Framework, 
have sent a strong signal that mono-disciplinary is what is most highly valued. The pressures 
exerted on younger researchers in particular may therefore have skewed their research focus 
away from interdisciplinary, more heterodox or non-mainstream research, not to mention 
more risky and long-term research. More generally, the trend has been for researchers to 
become more compliant with disciplinary authority over time (Martin and Whitley, 2010). 
Thirdly, the RAE has narrowed the focus on research publications, even though the outputs of 
research can take a variety of forms (e.g. trained people, new instrumentation or techniques, 
presentations at conferences and other meetings, contract research and consultancy), many of 
which are often as important in terms of transferring ideas or knowledge (Salter and Martin, 
2001). Moreover, in the recent Research Excellence Framework (REF) – another term with 
somewhat sinister Orwellian overtones – the focus in some fields narrowed even further to 
just articles in ‘leading’ journals, with books, book chapters, articles in ‘lesser’ journals and 
so on counting for little, irrespective of the quality of research they contain (Martin and 
Whitley, 2010). Instead, the emphasis is on ‘4* journals’, encouraging a very one-
dimensional view of what the work of an academic is all about. Whilst for some fields or 
certain types of research, these may be the most important outlet for research findings, for 
others this is far less true. In particular, for interdisciplinary research (or work within a 
specialty that does not ‘fit’ within one of the established disciplines around which REF panels 
are organised), for user-oriented research, for long-term and large-scale research where the 
results can only be conveyed in a book, or for research focussing on a regionally specific 
topic too ‘narrow’ to be of interest to a ‘mainstream’ journal, in all these cases researchers 
may again be substantially disadvantaged, just as they were in previous RAEs, despite all the 
official rhetoric before each new assessment exercise that ‘this time things will be different’. 
After six failed attempts, it must surely be clear to all that, whatever the good intentions, 
assessment panels organised on the basis of traditional disciplines, while they may be 
reasonably effective at evaluating the research from departments operating within the 
mainstream of that discipline, are intrinsically incapable of dealing with, and treating fairly, 
any department or unit operating outside that disciplinary mainstream (Rafols et al., 2012). 
The introduction of national research assessment systems, almost invariably organised around 
disciplines, also means that in the UK and elsewhere, there lurks an inherent fundamental 
contradiction at the heart of science policy. For 20 years or more, governments have exhorted 
researchers who are supported with public funding to go forth and find ‘users’ for their 
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research, to ascertain what are the long-term research needs of those users and to factor these 
into their research agenda at least to some extent, involving those users at an early stage in 
the research rather than just approaching them in the final stages. 
Many academic units have responded to such policies, recognising they had a responsibility 
to offer something to society in return for public funding of their research. Those that have 
done so have almost invariably found that this takes them into interdisciplinary research of 
one form or another. Users’ problems rarely, if ever, come neatly wrapped within a single 
discipline. The results of such user-oriented research, where they merit academic publication 
(and not all do), may be suited to specialist interdisciplinary journals, or perhaps to journals 
in several adjacent disciplines. Then, every five years or so, along comes the Research 
Assessment Exercise or now REF, and researchers in such interdisciplinary research units are 
forced to screw themselves up into a single disciplinary pigeon-hole, ready to be assessed by 
a panel drawn almost entirely from the mainstream of that discipline.16 Faced with a 
submission containing publications in specialist interdisciplinary journals and in journals 
spanning several disciplines, with at best only a small fraction being seen as ‘top’ journals in 
that particular discipline, the panel will find it very hard if not impossible to award that unit a 
top grade, even if it is widely regarded as a world leader in its own specialised field. 
In an effort to square the circle of pursuing research ‘excellence’ while at the same time 
addressing economic or societal needs, the recent UK Research Excellence Framework added 
the assessment of ‘impact’ to the existing assessment of research excellence. While laudable 
in principle, it immediately raised a new problem. Impact comes in a great variety of forms. 
Impact for an engineer is very different to impact for a biomedical researcher or a sociologist 
or a historian. It is far from clear how one can assess impact systematically and rigorously 
across all fields and across all institutions in a truly comprehensive and reliable manner 
(Martin, 2011; see also Samuel & Derrick, 2015). As with previous assessment exercises, 
guidelines were issued and the ‘rules of the game’ kept changing right up to the time of the 
submissions. Subsequently, there will undoubtedly be widespread criticism of the ‘simple-
minded’ approach adopted, and work will start to ‘improve’ the assessment of impact in the 
following REF. REF 2 will consequently be more elaborate, more burdensome and more 
time-consuming. It will also encourage more sophisticated game-playing. Already, some 
                                                 
16  Indeed, such interdisciplinary researchers may not even be submitted for assessment, thus pushing them 
towards ever more applied or consultancy-type work. 
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universities intent on doing well in terms of impact have gone down the route of hiring 
professionals with expertise in advertising, marketing or PR to help write their ‘impact 
stories’, creating a new industry (in other words, the policy for assessing impact has already 
had an impact of its own, although one doubts whether this was the intended outcome). In 
order to keep up, other universities will increasingly be forced to do likewise. And so the 
cycle of ever increasing elaboration and game-playing will be repeated in REF 3 and beyond 
in a new version of the ‘Red Queen effect’ (Martin, 2011). 
What of the benefits of adding impact assessment to research assessment? While there are 
undoubtedly some, as researchers and institutions pay more attention to increasing the impact 
of their research17, there will also be ‘costs’. The response to any attempt to measure impact, 
however well intentioned, is that those being assessed will inevitably focus their efforts on 
those forms of impact that are more easily ‘captured’ through the assessment methodology – 
to the neglect of all other forms of impact that are too indirect, diffuse, complex or long-term 
to be readily assessed or measured with some indicator (Bevan and Hood, 2006; McLean et 
al., 2007). Yet those other forms of impact may be at least as important, if not more so. As 
Einstein is reputed to have observed: “Not everything that counts can be counted, and not 
everything that can be counted counts.”18 Whether the end-result of all this will be to enhance 
the long-term benefits from university research to society as opposed to merely channelling 
research into activities that can be readily assessed must be a matter of some doubt. 
In short, while some of the early efforts to improve the ‘efficiency’ of university research 
may have resulted in significant gains, attempts to achieve yet further gains have come at a 
disproportionate cost. Assessment schemes and performance indicators have over time tended 
to skew research towards ‘safe’, incremental, mono-disciplinary mainstream work guaranteed 
to produce results publishable in ‘top’ academic journals, and away from interdisciplinary 
and more heterodox, risky and long-term research. They have also generated perverse 
incentives, encouraged cynical game playing to beat the system, and resulted in various 
unintended consequences (e.g. to generate more papers, it may be better to collaborate with 
researchers in other institutions rather colleagues in one’s own university – Martin, 2011). In 
short, after the early benefits had been achieved, repeated and prolonged application of 
                                                 
17  As with the original Research Assessment Exercise, the initial beneficial effects of adding impact assessment 
are likely to be much larger than those achieved in subsequent exercises, as diminishing returns set it. 
18  This attribution may be apocryphal. There is some evidence to suggest that the quotation should actually be 
attributed to Cameron (1963, p. 13). 
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research assessment and performance indicators may have resulted in a situation where the 
benefits are now outweighed by all the costs (indirect as well as direct). 
Discussion and conclusions 
From analyses of other sectors (e.g. Bevan and Hood, 2006; Boddy, 2006; Hood, 2007; 
McLean et al, 2007; Diefenbach, 2009 & 2013), it is clear that the problems discussed above 
are far from unique to higher education. Similar problems are being encountered in schools, 
hospitals, the police force and elsewhere. What might be the common driving forces behind 
all this? One may be the drive for ever greater economic ‘efficiency’, narrowly defined as 
more output per unit input, and with little regard for quality or anything else than cannot be 
measured in simple economic terms. Such an approach may suit organisations whose 
business model is based on mass production and standardisation but not those based on a 
more customised approach. As Woodward (1958) showed over 50 years ago, an 
organisation’s choice of ‘technology’ exercises a significant influence on its organisational 
structure, with organisations opting to pursue a trajectory based on mass production and 
standardisation benefitting from greater centralisation and hierarchy, while customised 
production demands a flatter organisational structure with greater dispersion of control. If 
universities have decided that in today’s competitive climate, they should pursue policies 
based on mass production and standardisation, then the pursuit of greater centralisation and 
hierarchy perhaps makes sense, enabling the ‘production system’ to be more controllable and 
predictable. However, that is a rather dispiriting view of what universities are all about. 
Related to this are the on-going consequences of the process often labelled as ‘new public 
management’, with its baleful emphasis on accountability, performance targets and the like, 
all of which encourages changes in behaviour to maximise one’s ‘score’ according to the 
designated metrics.19 In the case of UK schools, for example, the emphasis on league-tables 
based on the percentage of children passing exams has resulted in ‘strategic’ decisions by 
schools as to which exam board offers the easiest curriculum, which subjects have the highest 
pass rates, which students should be entered or not entered for different subjects, and so on 
(Hartford, 2012). Whether all this has actually resulted in better school education is unclear. 
Similarly, in the UK National Health Service (NHS), the political prominence given to 
performance targets such as reducing waiting lists times has spawned elaborate ‘gaming’ 
                                                 
19  For a critical analysis of the influence of performance indicators and other mechanisms of ‘quantified 
control’ on academics, their activities and their psychological wellbeing, see Burrows (2012). 
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schemes; for example, patients who are left waiting in ambulances outside the hospital until 
the Accident and Emergency department is able to see them within the prescribed period; or 
patients diagnosed as being in need of a particular treatment who are not placed on the 
relevant waiting list until sometime later, condemning them to a state of limbo until such time 
as they can be safely placed on the waiting list without jeopardising the current target for that 
hospital or treatment (numerous other examples of such ‘gaming’ in the NHS can be found in 
Bevan and Hood, 2006). Likewise, in the case of the police, only certain types of crimes may 
be reported, while others may be re-classified so that an improvement trend can be claimed 
(Coulson, 2009, p.277). Whatever benefits new public management is supposed to bring (and 
there may indeed be some) need to be set against the deleterious effects and wasted efforts 
associated with such game-playing. (For a critical discussion of gaming with regard to the 
application of performance indicators to the management of public services, see Hood, 2006.) 
Another wider driving force is linked to globalisation and increasing competition, whether for 
students, income or faculty. In the case of universities, one way in which this has manifested 
itself is in the current obsession with international league tables, based on the Shanghai 
rankings or one of the other sources of such rankings. That the methodology involved in all 
these ranking is highly dubious is often overlooked. Instead, all Vice-Chancellors, Rectors 
and University Presidents seem intent on improving the ranking for their university, and 
doing whatever it takes to achieve this. Because Nobel Prizes feature so prominently in the 
Shanghai rankings, this can give rise to disputes over which university a Nobel laureate 
should be credited to. For example, the 2007 Nobel Prize for Chemistry was awarded to 
Gerhard Ertl, who, according to the official Nobel website carried out his prize-winning 
research at the Fritz-Haber-Institut der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, Berlin. However, he had 
also held a number of part-time or visiting posts with the Free University, Humboldt 
University and the Technical University of Berlin, who all duly claimed him as their own. 
Unable to sort out these competing claims, the compilers of the Shanghai ranking had no 
option but to drop these institutions from their rankings over the following years. 
A further factor that appears to be at work is the growing use of head-hunters when a senior 
post in an organisation is to be filled.20 While the use of head-hunters began in the private 
sector, by the 1990s the practice had spread to universities, not just for Vice- Chancellors and 
                                                 
20  “In recent years, two-thirds of the presidential searches conducted by large [US] universities have been 
directed by professional head hunters” (Ginsberg, 2011a, p.5). 
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their deputies, but subsequently also for deans, heads of departments and director of research 
centres, and later even for professors. Head-hunters have often been used in combination with 
more traditional approaches of search committees consisting of senior academics and others. 
The head-hunters, in order to justify the very considerable sums of money they charge for 
their services, understandably felt they needed to demonstrate their ability to bring other, less 
obvious candidates into consideration. Indeed, they then worked hard at the short-listing stage 
to show that ‘their’ candidates were the strongest. The consequence was often the 
appointment of an outside candidate, say as a Pro-Vice Chancellor, who probably would not 
have been appointed through the traditional academic process, and who their previous 
employers were only too happy to write supportive references for and say ‘goodbye’ to. 
Coming into a new university environment in which they have no powerbase and where they 
lacked any understanding of how the organisation operated and of its norms and values, such 
external appointees have often reacted by making decisions that seem to defy all logic. The 
more arguments and evidence are used by opponents to point to the flaws in their plan, the 
more determined they become to demonstrate their authority by sticking to their original plan, 
however misguided that turns out to be. 
Another transformation in universities over the last decade or two is the dramatic rise in the 
number of central university administrators and ‘support staff’.21 Each new initiative 
launched by senior university officials seems to require more such staff. Once in post, they 
then have to justify their existence by coming up with new bureaucratic procedures or adding 
to the complexity of existing ones, whether it relates to teaching or research or the relentless 
quest for ‘third mission’ funding.22 In the view of some, “institutions of higher education are 
[now] mainly controlled by administrators and staffers who make the rules and set more and 
more of the priorities of academic life” (Ginsberg, 2011a, p.1; see also Altbach et al., p.xiii). 
All of this raises the question: why have most academics so meekly accepted these 
developments? Some may be too frightened to voice their concerns publicly, particularly if 
                                                 
21  In US universities, administrative positions grew ten times faster than tenured faculty positions between 
1993 and 2009 (Campos, 2015). Likewise, in UK universities, the number of managers and non-academic 
professionals has been growing very much faster than academic faculty, especially in the leading (‘Russell 
Group’) universities (Wolf & Jenkins, 2015). Ginsberg (2011a & b) attributes many of today’s problems 
with universities to the dramatic increase in the proportion of administrators. 
22  Bozeman (2015) offers an explanation for the growing amount of ‘red tape’ with regard to one aspect of 
university work, namely publicly funded research, identifying the main drivers – bureaucratic overlap, 
response to crises (e.g. the Stanford presidential yacht scandal), and social and political ‘side payments” (i.e. 
“rules that must be attended to by university researchers and administrators but that do not affect the quality 
or quantity of scientific work” – ibid., p.26). 
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(like most full professors) they are on performance-related pay. Others may have bought into 
the ideology that all this constitutes ‘progress’, that such changes represent the only way of 
addressing the problems and challenges that universities face. (These are likely to include 
academics who go on to assume senior roles in universities, in which they then actively 
contribute to inflicting a more managerialist approach on their colleagues.) Most, however, 
remain baffled and frustrated, feeling powerless to resist23, not least because they are 
chronically overstretched with their teaching and research and their administrative 
responsibilities, all of which leaves no time to mount a coherent opposition.24  
An analogy can be drawn with the ‘boiled frog’ (Tichy and Ulrich, 1984, p.60). Experiments 
by physiologists in the 1870s suggested that, if a frog is placed in a saucepan of cold water 
that is then very gradually brought to the boil, the frog will not jump out but remain until it is 
eventually boiled; in contrast, a frog dropped into a saucepan of very hot water will 
immediately jump out again (Sedgwick, 1882). The empirical truth of this has since been 
challenged (Gibbons, 2007). Nevertheless, it offers a beguiling metaphor for what we have 
been witnessing in universities over the last couple of decades. If academics 20 years ago had 
been suddenly presented with the panoply of changes described above which were to be 
implemented in one fell swoop, the level of opposition would have been such that the 
proposed changes would have been thrown out en masse. Instead, however, the changes have 
been introduced incrementally and by stealth. At each step, academics may have felt: 
“Having already accepted all this, why resist going just a bit further?” 
But if academics continue to acquiesce to yet further changes of the type examined here, we 
risk eroding our sense of integrity, self-worth and dignity, becoming mere cogs in the higher 
education machine. It is not clear we are yet at the stage familiar to Winston Smith in 
Nineteen Eighty-Four or still some way off, but we are surely heading in that direction.25 The 
purpose of this article is to promote a debate on these matters. If others share similar concerns, 
perhaps they will join in that debate. If not, we risk facing the fate of the boiled frog. 
                                                 
23  This is not to say that there may well be significant passive resistance going on behind the scenes. 
24  Psychologists may have something interesting to contribute here. For instance, it may be that that a large 
proportion of academics are of the ‘obedient personality’ type, while a minority are opportunistic careerists 
(and a few even organisational psychopaths). There may also be some ‘schizophrenics’ who as faculty 
criticise managerialist procedures but who then enthusiastically impose them on others when reaching senior 
administrative positions. 
25  The fact that a British university professor was recently suspended for “sighing” and “making ironic 
comments” certainly smacks of Big Brother (Matthews, 2014). 




This article follows in the tradition of previous authors who have used the pages of 
Prometheus to air concerns about the current state of universities (e.g. Nedeva and Boden, 
2006; Rip, 2011). The author is grateful to all those colleagues who have discussed these 
matters and contributed to the examples drawn upon here. Many would doubtless prefer to 
remain anonymous rather than being thanked individually, but those happy to be named who 
contributed helpful comments on earlier drafts include John Holmwood, Robin Mansell, Jordi 
Molas, Howie Rush, Ed Steinmueller and Puay Tang. This article did not receive support 
from any funding source, having been prepared by the author in his own time (what little of it 
is left of it after coping with problems such as those described above). 
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